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INTRODUCTION
History is powerful. It shapes the politics and the identity of individuals, communities, and
nations. By extension, historians who write history shape the societies in which they work. The
history contained in textbooks, academic journals, and books contributes to the public’s
understanding of the past, but public history—history outside academia and aimed at a broader
audience—is also an influential medium for transmitting history. Public history can take many
forms, ranging from museums to landmarks, from oral histories to panel discussions, from day of
remembrance activities to multimedia presentations. Each piece, program, or historical site has
the potential to impact a wide audience, and public historians have a duty to ensure that they
present an accurate interpretation of the past. Inaccurate representations are harmful to society.
Public history can also give a voice to the voiceless, and practitioners can use their platform to
advocate for marginalized people. Thus, public history is a tool for social change, and through
their activism, public historians can promote a better future.
This thesis examines how the Japanese American community used public history to
revise and promote their history. Japanese Americans had a history of persecution, oppression,
and racism in the United States, and the generational trauma they suffered because of Internment
significantly damaged their community. Employing the tools of public history, Japanese
Americans, in the space of two decades, ended their silence about Internment and encouraged the
Japanese community to demand Redress. Beginning in the 1960s, public history programs about
Internment changed how people understood that history, healed community scars, and resulted in
the passage of Redress legislation in 1988.

THE POWER OF PUBLIC HISTORY
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The Japanese Americans who led the long crusade for Redress understood the power of history
to unite people and instigate social change. However, those who took part in the campaign likely
did not consider themselves public historians nor their actions part of an effort to engage in
public history. Instead, they saw their movement as a civil rights campaign to gain justice for
their suffering. But Redress was made possible by those who fought to revise the history of
Internment. Most people knew little about Internment because textbooks and mass media ignored
its history for the two decades following the end of the war.1 The Redress movement changed
such public perceptions. By sharing the Japanese American Internment experience publicly,
Redress activists slowly gained support from inside and outside the community until they finally
convinced Congress to pass legislation that earned them reparations.
Most broadly defined, public history is history packaged for the public. Public history has
three core concepts that distinguish it from academic history: collaboration, reflective practice,
and audience.2 Public historians collaborate with experts in other disciplines to broaden the
appeal of their programs. After a public history program opens to the public, historians use the
process of reflexive practice to evaluate and change it with suggestions from the audience.
Almost all public historians incorporate these two features into their practice. But the most
important feature of public history is audience because a public historian’s understanding of their
audience shapes the work they do. The general public does not spend time reading the most
recent historical interpretations, and Americans tend to trust family members and museums as
reliable sources more than academics.3 The public historian understands this public and seeks to
make inclusive, well-researched history accessible to a non-academic audience. Academics who
Don T. Nakanishi, "Surviving Democracy's ‘Mistake’: Japanese Americans and the Enduring Legacy of Executive
Order 9066," Amerasia Journal 19, no. 1 (1993): 16.
2
Cherstin M. Lyon, Elizabeth M. Nix, and Rebecca K. Shrum, Introduction to Public History: Interpreting the Past,
Engaging Audiences (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), 2-3.
3
Lyon, Nix, and Shrum, Introduction to Public History, 4.
1
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contribute to the field of history usually research and write for other academics, but public
historians research and write to reach as many people as possible, regardless of educational,
socioeconomic, or racial background.
Japanese Americans and Redress activists thought about their audience when they
revived and revised the history of Internment. Revisionist historians and social histories of
Internment began in academia, but Japanese Americans who contributed to campaigns for
Redress by sharing their own personal stories and spreading new interpretations of Internment
worked to persuade all Americans to think differently about the episode. In the process, they
engaged in public history. They did not view academics as the main audience of the Redress
campaign. Instead, they sought to reach as many people as possible using a variety of public
history strategies. They distributed educational materials during various campaigns, organized
pilgrimages, created landmark dedications, and mounted museum exhibits that changed how
most Americans viewed Internment, helping to further the Redress Movement.
All historians must contend with difficult histories that provoke shame or unease for their
audience. Public historians in particular should not shy away from displaying such histories
because they have a duty to their audience. Historian Edward T. Linenthal argues that the lessons,
especially difficult ones, a nation learns from its past can be applied to challenges in the present
and future.4 Public historian Andrea A. Burns adds that public historians should actively engage
and interact with the communities in which they reside.5 Because history helps shape the identity
of individuals and communities,6 ensuring that the disenfranchised have ownership of their

Edward T. Linenthal, “Epilogue: Reflections,” in James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, eds. Slavery and Public
History: The Tough Stuff of American Memory (New York: New Press, 2006), 224.
5
Andrea A. Burns, From Storefront to Monument: Tracing the Public History of the Black Museum Movement
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 179-88.
6
Thomas Cauvin, Public History: A Textbook of Practice (New York: Routledge, Taylor, and Francis Group, 2016),
Electronic book.
4
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history has become an important social justice tenet. As a result, historians who study
disenfranchised individuals and communities become activists themselves.7 The diversity of
modern America requires that responsible public historians collaborate with and study
marginalized communities and thus participate in social justice work. History has power and
those wielding it, particularly public historians, can help shape the present and future. By
ensuring that all groups have equal access to the ownership of history, public historians empower
the marginalized to learn from the past and improve the present. In short, if a public historian
neglects difficult histories, they rob their audience of the opportunity to learn from the mistakes
of the past.
Redress activists faced a decades-long battle to convince their audience to recognize a
part of American history that most wanted to avoid. They urged camp survivors to tell their
stories and participate in remembering Internment. And by resurrecting the history of Internment,
they helped increase Japanese American civic engagement and activism.8 Revisiting and revising
this history educated Americans about the reality of Internment and provided a catharsis for
Japanese Americans still troubled by their experiences.9 Providing an outlet for the emotions of
Internment survivors enabled activists to give the survivors of this difficult history a voice while
offering a service to the community in which they resided. Those who spread new interpretations
of Internment understand that ignoring the suffering of the people who faced past oppression
ignored the reality of those and other marginalized groups in the present. Japanese Americans
recognized that they had to teach the lessons they had learned about a government that let racism

7

James B. Gardner and Paula Hamilton, The Oxford Handbook of Public History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 79-80.
8
Nakanishi, “Surviving Democracy's ‘Mistake,’” 25.
9
Tule Lake Committee, Second Kinenhi: Reflections on Tule Lake, 2nd ed. (San Francisco, California: Tule Lake
Committee, 1980), 129-33.
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and xenophobia justify stripping citizens of their rights. Years later, historians have continued to
write about this history to warn against the pitfalls of oppressive ideologies.10
In Slavery and Public History: The Tough Stuff of American Memory, historians James
and Lois Horton present multiple case studies on the difficult history of slavery, revealing how
public historians and their audiences often clash over differing interpretations of history. Various
versions of the past exist in the public memory because people’s historical consciousness
developed from a variety of sources, including the media, school, family and friends, and the
government.11 Challenging an audience’s memory is a precarious endeavor. As historian David
W. Blight explains, memory “is often treated as a sacred set of absolute meanings and stories,
possessed as the heritage or identity of a community.”12 Audiences often feel ownership over
these historical memories. The sources of memory are varied and personal, and it “carries the
often more immediate authority of community membership and experience.”13 Public memories,
like history, influence identity and imbue certain groups with power.14 However, they differ
because of the emotional content inherently attached to them and because groups of people or
governments construct them rather than historians. History is more critical because it bases its
interpretations on evidence and reasoning. Public memory can provoke strong sentiments of
nationalism, unite survivors, and encourage a sense of communal identity.
Memory is a powerful tool and Japanese Americans used it to gain support for Redress.
Different versions of Internment existed in the public memory. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the
prevailing version maintained that the government imprisoned Japanese Americans for their

10

Richard Reeves, Infamy: The Shocking Story of the Japanese American Internment in World War II (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 274-75.
11
David Glassberg, "Public History and the Study of Memory," The Public Historian 18 (Spring 1996): 8-10.
12
David W. Blight, “If You Don’t Tell It Like It Was, It Can Never Be as It Ought to Be,” in Horton and Horton,
Slavery and Public History, 24.
13
Ibid, 24.
14
Ibid, 25.
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safety and out of military necessity. The Nikkei, people of Japanese descent living outside Japan,
developed a competing public memory of Internment and used it along with new historical
research to mobilize for Redress. The public history the Redress movement produced changed
the prevailing public memory of the event. Gaining support for their interpretation of history
ultimately enabled Japanese Americans to win an apology and reparations from the U.S.
government.

THE HISTORY OF INTERNMENT
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, inciting a
war between the two world powers and unleashing a wave of anti-Japanese hysteria in America.
Only a few months later the hysteria culminated in the unconstitutional imprisonment of over a
hundred thousand Nikkei most of them American citizens. Though Pearl Harbor proved a tipping
point, discrimination against Japanese Americans—and Asian Americans in general—had
existed in the United States since the first Asian immigrants arrived in the nineteenth century.
Immigrants from Asia came to North America for economic opportunity, but white Americans
established legal and social barriers that made it difficult for them to integrate into American
society or succeed financially. Believing that Asian Americans posed an economic and cultural
threat, Americans barred Japanese Americans from white institutions, legally restricted Asian
immigrants from owning property or acquiring citizenship, and in 1924 the federal government
set quotas for the number of immigrants allowed into the United States from various Asian
countries.15 Unwelcome at the social institutions, businesses, and schools that whites controlled,
Nikkei established their own cultural and economic centers—for example Little Tokyo in Los
Angeles—to serve their small but tight-knit communities. Segregation deepened the divide
15

Reeves, Infamy, 5.
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between the white majority and Japanese American minority on the West Coast and encouraged
more racism and suspicion. Consequently, most whites believed that Japanese Americans could
never assimilate fully into American society.16
Anti-Japanese sentiment snowballed after Pearl Harbor, but even prior to the attack the
Federal Bureau of Investigation had started compiling a list of “aliens” they considered potential
enemies of the state. While the list consisted mostly of first-generation immigrants from Japan,
or Issei, it also included German and Italian immigrants. The FBI targeted community leaders,
businessmen, and even pastors, rounding up such individuals only a few days after the attack on
American soil.17 Though they had committed no crime, the “enemy aliens,” a disproportionate
number of them Japanese, were suddenly arrested and imprisoned without trial.
The fear that Asian Americans posed a threat to the western American states—in the
racist language of the era, a “yellow peril”—did not end with these initial arrests. Resentment
and distrust grew as the war in the Pacific gained momentum. With discrimination rampant,
newspapers across the West Coast called for the exclusion of Japanese Americans. Farmers eager
to acquire Nikkei land and politicians vying for re-election jumped to endorse the increasingly
popular policy of exclusion. Government officials in Pearl Harbor amplified tensions right after
the attack by describing the possible rise of a fifth column, large numbers of Japanese people
working inside the United States to attack the U.S. government.18 Walter Lippman, popular
newspaper columnist and political commentator, repeated these inflammatory theories two
months after the attack, inciting fear across the country with a fantastical piece on a fifth column

16

Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 2-3.
18
Alice Yang Murray, Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the Struggle for Redress
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 34-37.
17
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rising on the West Coast.19 Many people fed the anti-Japanese paranoia because it benefitted
them financially, politically, or professionally.
Reports of Japanese military success in the Pacific, declarations of racist and antiJapanese agendas by nationalist groups like the Native Sons of the Golden West, and fabricated
newspaper stories that claimed Japanese Americans had attacked military centers and vital
infrastructure whipped the American public into a frenzy.20 Responding to the growing hysteria,
politicians and military officials constructed a false narrative, arguing that military necessity
required the forced removal of all Japanese Americans from the West Coast.21 General John L.
DeWitt and Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen helped craft this narrative which pressured government
officials to evacuate and imprison Japanese Americans. They even suppressed reports that
contained evidence that contradicted the claim of military necessity.22 Their narrative proved
difficult to dislodge even years later. After the war ended, government officials claimed that
Internment protected Japanese Americans from a hostile public. But no evidence exists that the
politicians and military officials who campaigned for Internment in 1942 cared about Japanese
American safety.23
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, just
over six weeks after Pearl Harbor. Japanese Americans could do little to stop their relocation and
incarceration. A small and repressed minority residing primarily on the West Coast, they
possessed no political power and received little support from their non-Japanese neighbors. E.O.
9066 enabled the military to create “exclusion zones” on the West Coast. Officials legally
restricted access to these zones, claiming that doing so was necessary to protect the country from
19

Reeves, Infamy, 49-51.
Murray, Historical Memories, 22-23.
21
Reeves, Infamy, 42.
22
Murray, Historical Memories, 32-38.
23
Ibid., 15-20.
20
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invasion.24 Anyone living in these zones and identified as dangerous could be “relocated.”
Officials deliberately sanitized the language used in E.O. 9066 and in other publicly available
government documents dealing with Internment. The orchestrators of Internment used words like
“evacuation” and “assembly centers” as euphemisms for a much darker reality.25 Roosevelt’s
executive order did not specifically mention Japanese Americans, but it paved the way for the
creation of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), a government civilian organization initially
headed by Milton Eisenhower and later by Dillon Myer.
In March, General DeWitt ordered the military to remove “all persons of Japanese
ancestry, including aliens and non-aliens” from their homes along the West Coast. Evacuation
orders mandated that internees take only what they could carry.26 They had to sell or leave
behind all other possessions and property. The speedy removal forced many Nikkei to accept
paltry sums for the property they left behind.27 Most had little or nothing to return to when the
war ended and the camps closed. Before the military corralled evacuees into camps, evacuation
orders demanded they appear at assembly centers, poorly and hastily constructed waystations
located on fairgrounds and racetracks. These centers, originally designed for livestock, had
extremely poor conditions, and many internees languished in them for months before the WRA
transported them to the camps.28
Most Nikkei were interned at one of the ten concentration camps controlled by the WRA,
but their experiences varied widely because they came from diverse backgrounds despite their
shared race. Still, conditions in all the camps were uncomfortable and at times almost unbearable.

24

Ibid., 40-44.
Karen L. Ishizuka, Lost and Found: Reclaiming the Japanese American Incarceration (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2007), 72.
26
Reeves, Infamy, 70.
27
Ibid., 70-76.
28
Ibid., 78-86.
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Most Nikkei interned were either Issei (first generation) or Nisei (second generation), and their
identities varied by religion, political alignment, economic status, profession, age, and origin.
Making matters worse, the WRA handled distributing food rations and solving labor disputes
poorly. The diverse backgrounds, the duress of imprisonment, and WRA mismanagement often
led to conflict among the internees and between the internees and government officials. Protests
soon became common in most camps. In 1943, the WRA relocated some families to Tule Lake
because their answers on a loyalty questionnaire made them appear dangerous.29
The WRA created the questionnaire to identify internees suitable for military service.30
After its implementation, the officials realized they could use it to weed out “disloyal” Japanese
Americans.31 Two questions, 27 and 28, proved particularly charged and confusing for the
families and individuals who answered them. Question 27 asked, “Are you willing to serve in the
armed forces of the United States on combat duty, whenever ordered?” Question 28 asked, “Will
you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the
United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of
allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or
organization?”32 Responses to the questionnaire varied and respondents answered no to these two
questions for a variety of reasons. Most internees did not understand the consequences of an
incorrect answer and some faced pressure to answer no. Issei struggled with question 28 in
particular. Legally barred from U.S. citizenship, they feared becoming stateless if they renounced
the emperor of Japan. Regardless of the respondents’ motives, WRA officials labeled Japanese
Americans who answered no or refused to answer at all disloyal—“the no-no’s”—and sent them
29

Murray, Historical Memories, 91.
“The Loyalty Questionnaire,” (1943), Densho Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.densho.org/sources/endenshopd-p72-00004-1/.
31
Murray, Historical Memories, 78-80.
32
“Loyalty Questionnaire.”
30
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to Tule Lake.33 The segregation caused further division, and when protests erupted in 1943, the
WRA imposed martial law for three months.34 The military’s control of Tule Lake worsened
relations between internees and the government. The WRA’s actions and its implementation of
the loyalty questionnaire polarized the Japanese American community and made camp life
increasingly volatile.35
The partnership between the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), a Nikkei civil
rights group, and the WRA also proved a source of contention in the camps. College-educated
Nisei established the JACL to reduce racism by promoting assimilation. Because the FBI
arrested the community’s Issei leaders, the mantle of leadership during World War II fell to the
JACL.36 Mike Masaoka, among other early JACL members, believed that cooperating with the
WRA would assure the U.S. government’s humane treatment of Japanese Americans. The JACL
worked with the WRA to ease the process of Internment and establish Japanese American loyalty.
The JACL painted Internment as service to the country, helped establish camps and organize
internees, and worked with officials within the camps to promote military service and
cooperation between Japanese Americans and their wardens.37 Many Nikkei distrusted JACL
members and accused them of spying for the WRA. Any internee even remotely associated with
the JACL faced discrimination from their fellow inmates. Even after Internment ended, the
JACL worked to prove Japanese American loyalty, favoring stories of Japanese American
military valor in Europe and ignoring the anti-government sentiment within their community.38

33

Murray, Historical Memories, 91-92; Reeves, Infamy, 183-85.
Murray, Historical Memories, 92.
35
Reeves, Infamy, 186-94.
36
Murray, Historical Memories, 105.
37
Ibid., 111-15.
38
Ibid., 103-05.
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The JACL and their patriotic ideology had considerable influence on the Redress
movement. The organization initially pushed back against the movement, but Edison Uno, the
youngest JACL chapter president, first called for Redress in 1970. Uno’s experience differed
from that of the typical Nikkei.39 His father was one of the Issei the FBI arrested immediately
after Pearl Harbor. The FBI allowed him and his family to join his father in Crystal City, one of
the more comfortable concentration camps controlled by the Department of Justice rather than
the WRA.40 The JACL did not influence the creation and operation of Department of Justice
camps, so Uno did not have the same negative feelings about the organization shared by many
internees in the WRA camps. Uno stayed with his father in Crystal City until his release in 1947,
one of the last Japanese Americans to leave the camps.41 He returned to Los Angeles and less
than a year later joined the JACL. In time, he became an administrator and professor at the
University of California San Francisco.
Even with the poor conditions in camps, Japanese Americans carved out a life for
themselves, participating in classes and school activities, creating art and writing, organizing
clubs, and forming action committees to protest for better camp conditions.42 Many found
leaving the camps and returning to life outside barbed-wire fences difficult. Survivors of
Internment had to rebuild their lives while trying to avoid resurrecting the anti-Japanese hysteria
that provoked their imprisonment. During the war, four Supreme Court cases in which the court
ruled against Japanese American plaintiffs legally validated Internment, quashing any Nikkei
resistance in the years immediately after Internment ended.43 Silenced by fear, shame, and a
cultural climate that disapproved of criticizing the government, Japanese Americans dealt with
39

Ibid., 187-88.
Reeves, Infamy, 214.
41
Murray, Historical Memories, 187.
42
Tule Lake Committee, Second Kinenhi, 23.
43
Reeves, Infamy, 93-97.
40
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the mental and emotional trauma caused by Internment in a multitude of ways.44 Some chose to
become model citizens, achieving academic and financial success. Others changed their name to
hide their Japanese ancestry. Nikkei distanced themselves from their community in an effort to
assimilate, shunning any controversial Japanese American people and topics. Iva Toguri’s story
demonstrated the Nikkei community’s reluctance to associate with notorious Japanese
Americans. Toguri, one of the many women Imperial Japan coerced into working for Radio
Tokyo, became infamous for broadcasting Japanese propaganda messages to Allied troops.45
Toguri returned to the United States in 1947, and in 1948 the federal government arrested and
charged her with eight counts of treason. A federal court convicted her in 1949 and sentenced her
to ten years in prison, along with a ten thousand dollar fine. The Japanese American community
largely ignored her plight, more worried about saving themselves from persecution than
defending someone so notorious.
Despite their struggles, success stories of Japanese Americans filled the mainstream
media in the 1960s.46 William Pettersen, a sociologist at the University of California Berkley,
authored an article for the New York Times Magazine in 1966 that encouraged the model
minority myth.47 He argued that Japanese Americans achieved success unaided, citing statistics
that proved Japanese Americans had higher levels of education and earned more money—when
comparing median family income—than white Americans. In reality, Japanese American men
received lower wages than white men with the same level of education. But cherry-picking
statistics enabled some Americans to compare the success of the Nikkei to the perceived failure

44

Murray, Historical Memories, 190-200.
John Leggett, “Tokyo Rose: Traitor or Scapegoat?: After World War II, an American Girl Named Iva Toguri
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of other minorities. When minority activists protested for change, journalists and politicians
pointed to the Nikkei as an example of how hard work could overcome racism.48 Perpetuating
the model minority myth enabled conservatives to pit minorities against one another and
discourage civil rights protests. Frustrated with this myth and its political consequences for the
civil rights movement, Edison Uno wanted to forge a new narrative that revealed the diversity of
the Japanese American experience. But he could not do it alone.
ORIGINS OF THE REDRESS MOVEMENT
Ethnic pride, anti-war, Black Power, and civil rights movements swept through the nation in the
1950s and 1960s, but few Japanese Americans participated in these movements.49 Conservative
JACL members, like many Issei and Nisei, emphasized the success of Japanese American
assimilation and wanted to discourage political retaliation. When Japanese Americans talked
about Internment, they evoked the experience to prove Nikkei loyalty.50 However, African
Americans’ celebration of their ethnic heritage led many Sansei, third generation Japanese
Americans, to resent their parents’ self-imposed silence. Sansei, especially those on college
campuses, demanded more information about their background and culture.51 In response,
colleges on the West Coast began to offer Asian American studies curricula, and Uno became
one of the first instructors of these new courses.52 Still the Sansei’s journey did not end with
college classes. They began to build their own grassroots campaign modeled after the African
American example, organizing political demonstrations to expose the history of oppression and
pursue a more equitable future.53 By the end of the 1960s, more Nikkei joined the “yellow power”

48
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William Wei, The Asian American Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 15-16.
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movement, and despite its internal diversity the community bonded over the memory of
Internment. In these actions lay the foundation of the Redress Movement.
Most former internees did not join radical Sansei political movements, but pride
movements encouraged Nisei to question why they felt ashamed about their Nikkei culture.
Using public history strategies to revive the memory of Internment, Sansei convinced many
Nisei to share their stories and become more politically active through campaigns and
pilgrimages. Uno and others called on camp survivors to break their silence and for more
scholars to research Internment. Before the late 1960s, Japanese Americans had authored few
books on Internment, but as the Redress movement progressed more Nikkei-produced media
entered bookstores and television networks. The more Nikkei remembered Internment, the more
active they became politically. Japanese Americans who made their memory and interpretations
of history known to all Americans laid the foundation for Redress. What follows are three case
studies examining the public history strategies that animated the campaign to repeal “America’s
Concentration Camp Law”; pilgrimages to the concentration camps the government used for
Internment; and the small number of forward-looking exhibits that displayed difficult histories to
a broad audience.

REPEAL OF TITLE II
Anti-communist hysteria during the Cold War prompted the U.S. government to pass Title II of
the Internal Security Act of 1950, or the Emergency Detention Act (Title II). The act empowered
the attorney general, at the behest of the president, to apprehend any potential spy or saboteur.54
If the president declared a state of Internal Security Emergency, suspect individuals who had not
54
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broken the law could nonetheless face imprisonment in Justice Department camps like Tule Lake,
which the federal government had maintained in anticipation of further use.55 Lawmakers who
drafted Title II had also helped orchestrate Internment in the 1940s, and they based the new act
on the original legislation passed to permit Interment.56 The prevailing public memory of
Internment justified the law and Americans believed that national security required imprisoning
innocent citizens without trial.57 Initial efforts to repeal Title II—known by critics as “America’s
Concentration Camp Law”—led by minority organizations such as the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People and the American Jewish Congress failed to produce
results.58 Government officials never invoked the law’s provisions in the late 1950s and early
1960s, but seventeen years after its passage, the political unrest of the 1960s revived the specter
of American concentration camps.
The civil rights movement, Vietnam War protests, race riots, and the Black Power
movement disrupted the political status quo in America. Individuals belonging to these minority
and leftist groups feared retaliation in the form of mass arrests and imprisonment by the federal
government and they began a coordinated effort to repeal Title II. Some legislators and law
enforcement officials made public statements in 1968 suggesting they would use Title II to
detain Communists, Black nationalists, and rioters.59 These statements confirmed the concerns of
journalist Charles R. Allen who had published a booklet two years earlier entitled Concentration
Camps U.S.A. Allen’s work and the statements of government offices reignited fears that the

Norman Y. Mineta, “An Oral History with Norman Y. Mineta—Segment 1,” interview by Duff Griffith, Japanese
American Oral History Project Collection, Oral History, February 10, 1975, Densho Digital Repository courtesy of
CSU Fullerton Center for Oral and Public History.
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Ibid., 170.
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government would re-open concentration camps and detain citizens without charge.60 Most
worrisome, Allen’s work identified civil rights activists as possible targets for imprisonment.
Concerned with the possibility of another mass incarceration, Japanese Americans and
other minority groups began organizing support for the repeal of Title II. In 1967, Ray Okamura,
former internee, scholar, and activist, tried to persuade the JACL to participate in the campaign
by invoking the memory of Japanese American victims of Internment.61 He described JACL
involvement as a “public duty” and insisted that because Japanese Americans had a history of
unjust incarceration, they could speak more meaningfully about the need for repeal.62 The JACL
was reluctant to contribute to the movement. Its conservative members worried that they had
little chance of overturning an authoritarian security act during a politically turbulent time.
Okamura knew the JACL, the only national Japanese American civil rights group, enjoyed
considerable influence in Congress, and its involvement proved essential to the eventual success
of the repeal.63 Unable to win JACL’s support while not a member, Okamura joined the
organization and started the Ad Hoc Committee to support the repeal effort. Okamura’s
committee functioned much like a public history project, collaborating with other groups to build
support for repeal, appealing to a wide public audience, and using reflexive practice to meet the
needs of that audience. The committee used Japanese American public memory and recent
literature on Internment to revise history and reform the dominant public memory. In effect, they
became the Redress movement’s first public historians.
With the help of social justice student groups such as the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA), the Third
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World Liberation Front, and the Black Panther Party, the Ad Hoc Committee campaigned for the
Japanese American community’s support.64 Okamura and his committee convinced some West
Coast JACL chapters to back the campaign, but he and his Sansei action groups had yet to win
over the organization’s conservative national leaders.65 At the JACL national convention in 1968,
the AAPA, working with the Ad Hoc Committee, plastered replicas of the 1942 evacuation order
on the conference site walls before visitors arrived.66 In the same way that public historians use
artifacts in an exhibit, the committee highlighted the evacuation order to start a conversation
about Title II and Internment history among the Nisei survivors who attended the conference.
However, some conference visitors balked at the notices because the memory of Internment
remained painful for many in the Japanese American community. Still, the JACL voted to
oppose Title II, a product of the skilled political maneuvering of the Sansei activists.67
In addition to the evacuation order, the committee’s public education tactics included
sharing recently published works about Internment. For example, students distributed copies of
Allan R. Bosworth’s America’s Concentration Camps at the conference.68 Bosworth, a World
War II United States naval officer, was among the first to describe the Internment sites as
“concentration camps” instead of “relocation centers,” the term the WRA had used publicly in
the 1940s.69 The committee made the book easily accessible for their Japanese American
audience, connecting the community to new perspectives on Internment. Uno later used Allen’s
book to justify calling the Internment sites “concentration camps.”70 Masumi Izumi, a professor
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of Japanese language and culture, claims that Allen’s book “contributed significantly to
popularizing the knowledge about the internment among Americans.”71
The JACL’s involvement complicated decision-making in the repeal campaign. The Ad
Hoc Committee and the JACL’s older conservative leaders struggled to agree on the plan for the
campaign. Okamura and Masaoka, who had risen to the position of JACL Congressional lobbyist
in the years following the war, had different opinions on the tactics, but they settled on a plan
that incorporated both of their strategies. Okamura worked with the more progressive Sansei and
minority groups to oversee a “national public information and education program.”72 Meanwhile,
Masaoka used the conservative narrative of Japanese American cooperation with the government
and military enlistment to convince politicians that Japanese Americans were loyal citizens who
sought to protect individual rights.73
The Ad Hoc Committee intended their program “to inform and educate not only Japanese
Americans and the public-at-large, but also those who, because of their own experiences and
motivations, should be more concerned with the implications of Title II.”74 They used a threepronged approach. Committee members organized lectures and educational outreach programs at
cultural centers and universities; developed media series in TV, radio, and newspapers; and
encouraged constituents to write to their representatives.75 Okamura and the progressive groups
used the memory of Internment to incite righteous rage and a need for justice among Japanese
Americans. They despised the JACL’s version of history that encouraged Americans to think of
Nikkei as a model minority. Instead, the committee presented a version of history that criticized
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the government’s decisions regarding Japanese Americans and condemned the racism that
encouraged Internment.76 They sought to convince the silent Nisei to speak about their
experiences, converting them into activists. Still, while Okamura disagreed with the JACL’s
history of assimilation, both he and Masaoka knew that Okamura’s progressive version of
Internment would not convince legislators.77
Thus, Masaoka’s efforts to persuade politicians to repeal Title II emphasized the
patriotism and success of Japanese Americans.78 The JACL’s influence and its understanding of
Congress proved indispensable to the repeal campaign. Unlike the organizations that campaigned
to repeal Title II in the 1950s, conservative politicians could not write Masaoka and the JACL
off as a radical organization. Masaoka purposefully distanced the JACL from the progressive
groups that worked with the Ad Hoc Committee in order to appear more conservative.79 He
understood that leftist groups had tried and failed to effect repeal in the past, and he wanted the
new campaign to avoid the same mistakes. His model minority interpretation of history appealed
to conservative legislators more than Okamura’s grassroots effort.
The Ad Hoc Committee left most of the political maneuvering to Masaoka. It also
developed a less controversial message to appeal to mainstream Americans.80 The change
becomes apparent in a comparison of the Ad Hoc Committee’s publication, an Anti-Detention
Camp Fund leaflet, and a Sansei student activist publication, Gidra magazine. Okamura’s leaflet
contained a short passage warning about concentration camps in America and asking for
monetary support.81 Two bold graphics, a guard tower and barbed wire, bookended the text of
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the leaflet, and the words “Concentration camps in America? Maybe,” covered the top of the
page.82 While the leaflet used the provocative term “concentration camp” instead of “relocation
centers,” its argument for the repeal proved less incendiary. The leaflet reasoned that since
Japanese Americans had a history of wartime imprisonment, they felt duty-bound to prevent the
government from re-opening the camps. Conversely, Gidra emphasized the racism and
oppression inherent in Title II.83 A graphic that depicted news headlines from the future such as
“Presidential Order Will Place Black People into Camps,” and “Troops Attack Blacks,”
dominated its pages.84 Gidra unabashedly displayed the left’s interpretation that racism helped
cause Internment. Most Americans disapproved of this message and Okamura omitted these
interpretations to win over his audience.
In 1971, Congress passed a bill repealing the Emergency Detention Act. However, the
Title II campaign did not convince all or even most Americans to revise the memory of
Internment. Congressional speeches espousing the model minority myth revealed that the
prevailing public memory condemned Internment but ignored the generational trauma that it
caused.85 In particular, most Americans did not recognize racism and oppression as a key factor
of Internment. Still, the repeal campaign convinced many Japanese Americans to give up their
silence about Internment and begin to question the dominant public memory.86 As a result of the
campaign, moreover, a growing number of Americans recognized the morally deplorable nature
of Internment, empowering the Japanese American community to consider the possibility of
Redress and reparations. The JACL’s presence in the campaign marked a turning point for the
Japanese American community. Resurrecting and revising Internment history became the goal of
82
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more Japanese Americans and not just progressive Sansei. Reflecting this change in the
community, the 1970 JACL convention voted to campaign publicly for Redress. In short, an
increasing number of Nikkei including more moderate Nisei became involved in the Redress
movement as a result of the repeal campaign.87

PILGRIMAGES
In 1969, a year after the JACL voted at its national convention to fight for the repeal of Title II,
two Sansei activists, Warren Furutani and Victor Shibata, sat in a Denny’s restaurant searching
for a way to unite and mobilize the Japanese American community.88 They had seen and heard
about other marginalized groups organizing marches to locations of historical and cultural
importance, and they recognized the power of place and the memory and emotions people
attached to them.89 Both Sansei and other younger members of the Nikkei community knew their
parents were reluctant to talk about their Internment experiences. In response, they started to
organize an event to visit one of the camps.90 Manzanar, located two hundred miles away in rural
California, was the closest camp to Los Angeles, where the organizers lived, but it was still too
far for a march. The two Sansei decided instead that they would organize a pilgrimage in
December of 1969.
Over one hundred people in cars and buses participated in the first official pilgrimage to
Manzanar, a little-known site in the California countryside.91 The Manzanar Pilgrimage was the
first of its kind, and the event began a tradition for the Japanese American community that
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continues to the present day. By virtue of visiting the site, Japanese Americans halted the erasure
of the camps’ history in public memory. The pilgrimage enabled participants to learn about the
history of Japanese American Internment, convinced survivors to tell their stories, inspired
additional pilgrimages to other camps, and eventually resulted in Manzanar becoming an
officially recognized historical site. Participants and organizers used the pilgrimage to resurrect
the memory of Internment and draw attention to the Japanese American interpretation of history.
In short, they engaged in public history to mobilize their community for Redress.
Pilgrimages are effective tools for presenting public history because they rely on
collective memory. Historian David W. Blight explains that memory coalesces in objects and
sites, enabling public historians to use places or things to trigger memories, both personal and
public.92 Activists had already used historical objects—specifically, the evacuation order—to
elicit emotional responses among Nisei, but the pilgrimage was their first major use of place to
instigate change in the community and share history.93 Memories tied to a specific place are
especially powerful because the permanence of landscapes can help individuals reconnect with
the place and uncover old memories.94 Robert Nakamura joined the Manzanar Pilgrimage to take
pictures, but soon discovered that he had repressed Internment memories. After his return, he
remembered some of his childhood activities in the camp.95 However, few Issei and Nisei joined
the first pilgrimage. Most of the participants were Sansei because for Internment survivors,
returning triggered painful memories. In contrast, Sansei, who had never experienced the camps,
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enjoyed a new sense of a “shared past” that helped them understand a history their parents had
never shared with them.96
Pilgrimages can be emotional experiences because they link people to a significant place
and the power and history of that location.97 Places that became the location of pilgrimages are
significant for many reasons—religious, familial, cultural—but Edward Linenthal theorizes that
“the very lack of memorial attention to marking certain acts of racist violence on the landscape
calls attention to such places for that very reason: previously ignored sites become significant
because they have been ignored.”98 The public had ignored Manzanar and other camps and even
expunged them from the landscape following their closure. The federal government tore down
and sold many of the barracks, and by 1969 little remained of the original camp.99 But the
pilgrimages reverted the ravages of time and disuse. Japanese Americans intentionally brought
attention to the camps to resurrect Internment history. By preserving the camps and educating
others about what happened in places like Manzanar, the pilgrimages fueled the Redress
movement.100 Manzanar’s difficult history sparked strong emotions and painful memories, but
the pilgrimages channeled the effects of trauma into social justice movements like Redress.101
The pilgrimages helped people connect or reconnect with their history, and sharing collective
memories enabled Nikkei to reinterpret their history.102
The Manzanar pilgrimages in the 1970s and 1980s typically lasted for hours, and those
attending participated in a range of activities meant to educate the community, inspire activism,
instill a sense of identity, encourage Japanese Americans to have pride in their culture, and teach
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Nikkei interpretations of history. Activities at the first pilgrimage mostly centered around
cleaning up the site and providing religious rites for those buried in the camp cemetery. The
messaging in 1969 mostly galvanized visitors to participate in the Title II repeal campaign.103 In
later years, the Manzanar Committee, consisting of Nisei like Edison Uno and Sue Kunitomi
Embrey, took over organizing and theming the pilgrimages. At the first Manzanar Pilgrimage
religious ceremony became the main activity, but later programs consisted of photo presentations,
traditional Japanese dancing, and music.104 Speeches also became a regular feature of the
pilgrimages. Such speeches could be calls to action, camp testimonials, or a mixture of both.
Karl Yoneda’s speech in 1972, for example, told the emotional story of his Internment
experience and implored the audience to protest injustice.105 Pilgrimages used various strategies
to teach history just as public history institutions today use various strategies to reach a wide
audience. While Nikkei dominated pilgrimages,106 the diversity within the Japanese American
community required that pilgrimage organizers used a multifaceted approach to make history
more accessible for all attendees.
In 1974, more social justice-oriented Nikkei organized the first official pilgrimage to
Tule Lake,107 and in the years following the list of camps to which Nikkei led pilgrimages
expanded.108 The growing number of pilgrimages helped expose more members of the Japanese
American community to the memory contained in the camps, and the Tule Lake pilgrimage in
particular helped reach a more diverse Nikkei audience. As a camp that housed “disloyal”
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internees, Tule Lake provoked a slightly different set of collective memories than other camps.109
Unlike Manzanar, activists could not interpret Tule Lake’s history as the imprisonment of loyal
citizens. Martial Law and the segregation of “no-no” internees at Tule Lake gave its prisoners
greater contempt for the government. As a result, some Tule Lake internees resisted the draft and
even renounced their United States citizenship.110 The model minority myth popular with
conservative Nisei and the JACL erased the history of resistance at Tule Lake, but pilgrimages to
the camp invited differing interpretations of Internment, helping to reach Nikkei alienated by the
loyal citizen interpretation. The revival of Internment memories did more than offer Nisei a
cathartic release. Sansei and Yonsei, third and fourth generation Japanese Americans born after
Internment, shared in the collective memory of Internment by their presence and participation in
the pilgrimages.111 Pilgrimages taught Sansei and Yonsei about how they might react if they had
been forced behind the barbed wire at camps like Tule Lake.112 Before the pilgrimages, younger
generations resented their parents and grandparents for not resisting Internment, but after
pilgrimaging to Tule Lake, Sansei and Yonsei realized the inaccuracies in their old
interpretations. The younger Nikkei gained new insight into their parent’s choices, enabling them
to relate to the older generations. The connection developed through the mutual ownership of
Internment memories forged cultural bonds among the Nikkei and helped establish the
community’s identity.113 For many Japanese Americans, pilgrimages helped promote ownership
of Internment history.
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In contrast to the Manzanar pilgrimages, Tule Lake pilgrimages lasted days and had more
activities to engage participants. In addition to the religious ceremonies and speeches, those who
stayed overnight enjoyed evening programs that combined artistic expression and historical
interpretation. The Tule Lake pilgrimages, like those at Manzanar, educated the Japanese
American community and others about Internment and built support for the Redress
movement.114 But Tule Lake’s different history and dissimilar audience enabled the pilgrimages
to influence a previously unreached audience. Edison Uno’s article about the 1975 Tule Lake
pilgrimage argued that a history lesson alone was insufficient if Japanese Americans did not fight
for equality in the present.115 The Tule Lake committee collaborated with social justice
organizations such as the Little Tokyo People’s Rights Association and the National Coalition
for Redress and Reparations.116 These groups contributed to the pilgrimages by leading evening
programs. Together, they acted as public historians when they worked within the community to
promote a better future through Redress.
The visibility of these pilgrimages eventually enabled each concentration camp site to
gain official acknowledgement as important historical sites. Manzanar first gained recognition
after the Manzanar Committee applied to the state of California to place a historical state
landmark at the site.117 The application met with little resistance at first. The California
Historical Landmarks Advisory Committee made Manzanar California State Landmark number
850 in 1972, but it took a year for the state landmarks committee, the JACL, and the Manzanar
Committee to agree on the wording of the plaque.118 The advisory committee objected to the
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language the Manzanar Committee used to describe Internment, but the activists refused to
replace words like “concentration camp,” “racism,” and “economic greed” with euphemisms.119
Facing a battle in their efforts to ensure that their history was memorialized as they had
remembered it, the committee joined forces with historians and the media to promote their
interpretation of history and win grassroots support for their plaque.120 The JACL’s political
influence at the state level also helped. As a result, in 1973 the JACL and the Manzanar
Committee unveiled a plaque which read:
In early part of World War II, 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were interned in
relocation centers by Executive Order 9066, issued on February 19, 1942. Manzanar, the
first of ten such concentration camps, was bounded by barbed wire and guard towers,
confining 10,000 persons, the majority being American citizens. May the injustices and
humiliation suffered here as a result of hysteria, racism, and economic exploitation never
emerge again.121
Around one thousand people came to Manzanar for the debut of the plaque, the largest crowd the
pilgrimage had drawn thus far.122
Three years later, the Tule Lake Committee also campaigned for a landmark designation
and succeeded in the face of similar resistance. Despite Tule Lake’s role as a segregation center
for Japanese Americans deemed disloyal by the U.S. government, its plaque made no reference
to the site’s history of resistance.123 Japanese Americans often hid the history of resistance in
camps because it disrupted their status as a model minority, potentially endangering the progress
of assimilation. Unveiled in 1979, the plaque’s message was nearly identical to its counterpart in
Manzanar. The outcome of the battle over the plaques revealed that Japanese Americans were
gaining control over how their history was remembered, and the landmark committee’s
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acceptance of their interpretation highlighted the state of California’s recognition of the moral
wrong of Internment.124 The plaques reflected significant changes in the public memory of
Internment.
The pilgrimages and the public history strategies used to disseminate Japanese American
interpretations of Internment made possible the creation and erection of the plaques. Pilgrimages
helped the Japanese American community understand and accept the history of Internment and
how it affected the community’s identity. Survivors of Internment shared their collective
memories with the younger generations, building new bonds with the Issei and Nisei. The
addition of the Tule Lake pilgrimages enabled Japanese American activists to educate a broader
audience that did not identify with Manzanar’s history. The official landmark recognition of
these camps highlighted the pilgrimages’ effectiveness as public history campaigns and started to
change the public memory of Internment in favor of Japanese American interpretations. The
California landmark victory represented a crucial step in the national reparations campaign
because it reshaped public memory. Moreover, the pilgrimages that lay at the center of the
campaign publicized the Redress movement and encouraged more people to become involved.

EXHIBITS
Among the more conventional public history efforts used by the Redress movement to educate
the American people were exhibits developed independently at two West Coast institutions. The
first exhibit, Pride and Shame, had a wide focus extending from the Issei’s first arrival in the
United States to the present. One of its seven sections dealt specifically with Internment. The
second exhibit, Executive Order 9066, consisted of pictures taken during Internment, most by the
photographer Dorothea Lange. Because these exhibits were not a part of the mainstream Redress
124
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movement, little information about them has survived. Still, the extant record reveals that Pride
and Shame and Executive Order 9066 were thought-provoking pieces of public history that
pushed Americans, particularly Japanese Americans, to revise the history and public memory of
Internment. While Redress required more than museum exhibits, they nonetheless influenced
those who saw them.
In 1970, while the Title II repeal campaign gained support across the country and in D.C.,
the Museum of History and Industry (MOHAI) in Seattle invited JACL chapters in the city to
organize an exhibit—meant to coincide with the 1970 Osaka Expo—about Japanese-American
history.125 The museum received a paltry budget of six hundred dollars, so like many cashstrapped curators, the exhibit planners reached out to the Japanese-American community in the
city to ask for help. The JACL collaborated with local Japanese-American community groups,
including churches, pan-ethnic coalitions, and culture clubs to plan the exhibit, acquire artifacts,
and advertise to the Seattle community.126 The committee selected the title Pride and Shame to
reflect the accomplishments of the Nikkei and the history of anti-Japanese racism and oppression
in the United States.127
As a small, local exhibit, Pride and Shame did not receive much attention from the media
despite its controversial topic.128 Still, it provided Japanese Americans in the area an opportunity
to share their experiences. Even though Internment was not the focus of the exhibit, Pride and
Shame did not shy away from displaying anti-Japanese propaganda or showing the reality of life
for families in the camps. The exhibit included a life-sized replica of a barracks room that
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displayed the furniture and space available to a typical family in one of the WRA’s concentration
camps. It stayed open for three months in 1970 and during that time thirty-four thousand people
attended, mostly Japanese Americans.129 In 1973, the exhibit received a grant from the National
Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) to travel to other institutions—over twenty in all—inside
the state of Washington.130 At most stops, the institutions provided opportunities for survivors to
speak to the audience and share their experiences or organized panel discussions led by Japanese
Americans.131
The MOHAI designed the exhibit as a celebration of Japanese American history and
heritage, but when the museum director saw the anti-Japanese and Internment sections, she
became upset. According to Tomio Moriguchi, the chair of the Seattle JACL Chapter and the
lead curator of the exhibit, Pride and Shame challenged the director’s personal memory enough
that she tried to have the offending two sections removed.132 Despite the director’s objections,
the exhibit toured for over two years and received positive responses at each stop. In the years
after its first showing, the curators used reflexive practice to make changes, responding to
comments from professionals and audience members.133 In 1975, the exhibit’s chair, Minoru
Masuda, determined that it was a “success in its efforts to reach the community with the purpose
of educating the viewers to the Japanese-American story in its proper perspective.”134 The
exhibit designers hoped it would reach a wide audience, but as a result of limited media exposure
few people outside the Japanese-American community saw it.
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Though the audience for the exhibit remained small, Masuda nonetheless concluded that
it gave Sansei a rare opportunity to learn about their ethnic history.135 Pride and Shame
successfully revived the memory of Internment in the Japanese-American community, but it
probably did not convince many people to join the Redress cause.136 Those who visited described
the exhibit as the beginning of a new “awareness” of Japanese-American history.137 In the twenty
years after WWII scholars published little information about Internment. This local exhibit’s
inclusion of Internment history revealed the gradual end of the Japanese-American period of
silence. Sansei often drove the Nikkei community’s interest in resurrecting Internment history in
their effort to obtain Redress.138 They aimed to connect the racism that fueled Internment to the
contemporary institutional racism Japanese Americans faced following the end of their
imprisonment.
Two years after Pride and Shame debuted in Washington state, the California Historical
Society (CHS) unveiled a photo exhibit that focused entirely on Internment. Entitled Executive
Order 9066, the exhibit ran for at least three years, though the records from the 1970s gave no
clear end date. In 1942, the WRA contracted Lange to take photos of Internment. She took
thousands of photos, but they remained inaccessible to the public until after the WRA disbanded
in 1946.139 Lange’s assistant, Richard Conrat, when assembling an exhibition of her work in
1965 for the Museum of Modern Art, came upon the photos Lange had taken for the WRA.140
His interest piqued, he and his wife, Maisie, began to look for other images of Internment.
Together, they found over twenty-five thousand though less than one hundred of them ended up
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in the exhibit. The Conrats chose photos they believed communicated the reality of Japanese
American life and exhibited a high compositional quality.141 The CHS partnered with the
Japanese American community, inviting those with a connection to Internment to participate in
exhibit discussions or volunteer as docents.142
Both the Conrats and the Japanese American community understood the gravitas of the
exhibit. Challenged by young Nikkei about their qualifications as Caucasians to present
Japanese-American history, the Conrats responded that the history of Internment was both
Japanese-American and American history.143 They recognized that all Americans, especially
white Americans who perpetrated the crime, needed to know the Japanese-American story. The
Conrats did not try to interpret Japanese-American history, but instead turned to the Japanese
Americans to present their point of view.144 The CHS’s decision to employ Nikkei as docents
enabled them to share their interpretations when they interacted with and answered the questions
of visitors. Some Nikkei eagerly volunteered as docents, but others did not want to revive
memories of Internment. Sue Kunitomi Embrey, a Nisei who like Edison Uno participated
actively in the effort to resurrect Internment, tried to convince others in the community to
volunteer, but many refused.145 Some remained too upset by Internment and did not feel ready to
share their memories.
Reactions to the exhibit varied, though they were often emotionally charged because for
the first time many Americans confronted a version of history that challenged the dominant
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public memory.146 While some Internment survivors could not bear to witness their difficult
history, others, like Patrick Hiyashi, connected with the photos and made peace with the past.
Nearly half a century later, Hiyashi still remembered the day he volunteered to sell the gallery
book at the exhibit. In 2017, he gave a speech at the CHS and described seeing the photos as a
life changing experience.147 Traveling beyond the West Coast and as far as Washington, D.C.,
and New York City, Executive Order 9066 reached a much wider audience than Pride and
Shame.148 Hiyashi’s experience demonstrated that the exhibit could be a powerful healing tool
for Japanese Americans, but it also disrupted the patriotic public memory of America during
World War II held by most whites.149 Edison Uno, who wrote the introduction for the gallery
book that Hiyashi sold, used the introduction to offer a fuller history because the photos only
subtly suggested the realities of Internment.150 Even though the exhibit presented an incomplete
understanding of Internment, some historical institutions opposed displaying such a difficult
topic and refused to host the exhibit.151 The executive director at CHS in 1972, Michael McCone,
remembered the rejections came with complaints such as “It will open old wounds” and the
exhibit will “make people remember what they are trying to forget.”152
Despite such negative reactions, the exhibit helped transform public memory, as more
Americans recognized the wrongs the government perpetrated against Japanese Americans
before and during the war. In 1972, Washington Post journalist Margot Kernan wrote a long
article that described the anti-Japanese sentiment in 1940s California, from a racist shopkeeper,
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to State Attorney General Earl Warren, to the influential Walter Lippmann.153 But while Kernan
described the broader context that enabled and promoted Internment, she overlooked its long
term effect on Japanese Americans. She also used passive voice to avoid condemning the federal
government’s actions. Instead, she embraced the JACL’s traditional narrative in which Japanese
Americans expressed their pride in being Americans. She even quoted a camp survivor who said
that he did not begrudge the U.S. government for its actions.154 While this narrative accurately
reflected the experiences of some Japanese Americans, it ignored the generational trauma many
still suffered.
By the mid-1970s, some Americans had started listening to the Japanese American
interpretation of Internment.155 But the dominant public memory of Internment as an unfortunate
extension of patriotism, made many Americans reluctant to recognize the damage Interment
caused to the Japanese American community. These two exhibits showed that Japanese
Americans had gained ground in telling their story. They had united the Nikkei community,
mounted successful public history campaigns, and ventured to tell their story to the nation
despite the pushback they received. Still, the Washington Post article demonstrated that most
Americans remained ignorant of Internment’s effect on the Japanese American community. The
Redress movement had more work to do to change the public memory.

COMMISSION LEGISLATURE AND REDRESS FINALLY EARNED
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On May 9, 1975, Harry Honda boldly provoked an audience with the headline, “How should we
seek reparations?” on the front page of the Pacific Citizen.156 Honda’s article described a recent
JACL panel that sought an answer to the question he posed. His bold headline revealed that the
organization began actively seeking Redress in 1975. Later that year, the Pacific Citizen reported
two separate surveys of JACL members, showing that most Japanese Americans wanted
reparations.157 However, the community did not agree on the nature of the reparations.158 Though
the JACL had adopted a resolution to pursue Redress in 1970,159 the organization’s conservative
members hesitated to act on that decision and the national JACL had not taken any substantive
steps to obtain Redress. Uno, who had proposed the resolution, knew that the JACL’s cautious
leadership would not invest resources and public support in an uncertain campaign for Redress
legislation.160 The Nisei had witnessed racially motivated retaliation after Pearl Harbor and
feared undermining the progress they had painstaking made transforming themselves into model
American citizens. Uno, a constant in the Redress movement and an influential leader in the
Japanese American community, noted in 1975 that the JACL would support Redress only if they
were certain the campaign would succeed.161 Such an outcome required that the JACL win
support from a significant portion of the broader American public, not just from Nikkei.
By the middle of the 1970s, the Japanese American community had freed themselves
from the shadow of their postwar shame and silence. The Nikkei community had reclaimed their
history and regained a sense of pride in their identity, achievements that resulted from the
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campaign to repeal Title II, the pilgrimages, and the exhibits. Each of these efforts used elements
of public history—audience, collaboration, and reflexive practice—to give a voice to Japanese
Americans and allow them to share their own memories and interpretations of Internment history.
The success of the Title II repeal campaign, the pride the pilgrimages instilled, and the visibility
the exhibits achieved changed the public memory of Internment and convinced a growing
number of Japanese Americans that they should receive reparations. Uno died in 1976 before he
saw the movement come to fruition,162 but other Japanese Americans who had worked with one
of the campaigns, pilgrimages, or exhibits continued their activism by joining the movement for
reparations. Jim Matsuoka, who had participated in the first Manzanar pilgrimage, worked with
the National Coalition for Redress/Reparations (NCRR) alongside Alan Nishio, who had
campaigned to repeal Title II.163 Tomio Moriguchi, who worked with the JACL on the Pride and
Shame exhibit, later joined the National Council for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR).164
As support for Redress expanded within the Nikkei community, sympathy for their tragic
history increased in mainstream America. Employing the same intentional public history tactics
the Ad Hoc Committee used to repeal Title II, the JACL mounted campaigns to convince
President Gerald Ford to rescind Executive Order 9066 in 1976 and to pardon Iva Toguri in
1977.165 While President Ford’s revocation of E.O. 9066 in 1976 did not amount to an apology, it
revealed that mainstream Americans supported policies that would rectify Internment. Toguri’s
pardon in 1977 demonstrated that Japanese Americans had the courage to campaign on behalf of
controversial issues surrounding their community and highlighted their power to revise difficult
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history.166 The triumph of both campaigns proved that Japanese Americans were changing the
national public memory of Internment using revisionist interpretations of history.
By the end of the decade, JACL leaders believed that Redress legislation could succeed,
but the community remained divided on what Redress should look like. In 1978, the JACL
elected Clifford Uyeda as the league’s president, and he oversaw the JACL’s participation in the
Redress movement.167 Uyeda, who chaired the campaign for Iva Toguri’s pardon, had
demonstrated his ability to win even against long odds.168 Uyeda and John Tateishi, whom
Uyeda appointed to lead the JACL’s National Committee for Redress, struggled to find a
Redress solution that would satisfy conservative and progressive Nikkei.169 At the behest of the
Japanese Americans involved in national politics, Tateishi proposed legislation to create a
commission to review the history of Internment and—if needed—make recommendations to
rectify the government’s transgressions.
Following the passage of the commission legislation in 1980, the JACL, in combination
with the NCRR, generated Japanese American interest in testifying at one of the eleven hearings
while the NCJAR helped publicize the commission and the campaign for Redress. The
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) researched the
history of Internment by examining government documents, but the commission later based
much of their findings on the testimonials of Japanese Americans at the hearings.170 The
members of these campaigns had experience using public history to rouse Nikkei support for
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revisionist history and Redress; to win over the commission, they applied the same public history
strategies. The JACL understood the conservative audience in Washington and they picked and
coached witnesses who shared a history of Japanese American loyalty to reach that audience.171
Conversely, the NCRR advocated for more varied interpretations, encouraging witnesses to
denounce the racism of Internment and demand monetary reparations. By promoting a history of
resistance, the NCRR sought to align themselves with other minority activist groups that might
sponsor or collaborate on the campaign.172 The NCJAR took an entirely different route to
Redress, pursuing a court battle instead of working with the commission. While the council
ultimately lost the suit, their public and lofty demands brought increased attention to the
movement.173
Though the commission did not satisfy some of the more progressive Nikkei, it helped
introduce the public to Japanese American interpretations of Internment. The commission gave
the emotional stories of Japanese Americans a public spotlight, highlighting a community that
had been silent for nearly half a century. At the end of 1982, the commission concluded its
investigation into Internment history. The following year it made five recommendations: the
government should offer a formal apology in the form of a joint resolution; the president should
pardon individuals convicted of violations of discriminatory wartime statues; Congress should
instruct agencies to evaluate requests for compensation of wartime losses; Congress should start
a fund for “educational and humanitarian purposes” to promote public understanding of
Internment and Redress; and Congress should offer a one-time payment of $20,000 to the
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surviving victims of Internment.174 The creation of CWRIC and its subsequent recommendations
proved that the public historians of the Redress movement had changed the interpretation and
public memory of Internment.
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which Ronald Reagan signed into law five years after
the CWRIC released its report, followed all the recommendations laid out by the commission.
The delay in the legislation’s passage reflects the change in legislators in 1987. Conservatives in
the 99th Congress, particularly in the Republican controlled Senate, focused on cutting costs and
spending.175 The election of 1986 flipped the Senate to the Democrats, making the 100th
Congress more receptive to JACL lobbying.176
After the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, the amount of information on
Internment written by Japanese American and historians increased dramatically.177 In contrast,
few historians have examined the Redress movement. This is a significant oversight. Though the
movement began as a way to help the community heal and take pride in their heritage, the
Japanese American Redress movement provides Americans with a guide for how marginalized
groups can use public history to achieve recognition and redress. Today, many African
Americans support reparation payments for the history of slavery.178 This effort could learn
much from the history of the Japanese American Redress movement. Exploring the Redress
movement through the lens of public history, provides public historians with a model of how to
use engaged scholarship to promote social justice in the communities with which they work.
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